Mandating interim reporting is lively discussed in Europe, especially since the European Union has set up mandatory quarterly reporting on the agenda. By examining the Swiss stock market, in which interim reporting became mandatory in 1997, we find that tightening disclosure frequency by mandating interim financial reports has a very limited and thus not convincing impact on information asymmetry. We suspect that firms that did not provide interim reports on a voluntary basis prior to the new rules potentially anticipated the insignificance of a greater information environment in their specific situation and thus reasonably chose not to publish costly interim reports.
Introduction
Is tightening disclosure frequency a reasonable action or an overregulation? We find that it has a very limited and thus not convincing impact on information asymmetry. Rather, firms that did not provide interim reports voluntarily before requiring those reports are those companies that already have lower information asymmetries prior to providing the forced mandatory interim reports.
While we do not aim at arguing that regulation on interim reporting is useless, our results emphasize that it is important to challenge the objective of those rules. The discussion on corporate transparency in general and the extent to which listed firms should provide interim information is still a lively and ongoing debate.
Especially against the background that history of mandatory interim reporting initiated almost a century ago, this may be somewhat surprising but in fact highlights the importance of this topic. In the US, around 1914 the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) listing agreements began requiring semiannual reporting for most newly listed firms. However, all SEC proposals that aimed to introduce mandatory interim reports countrywide encompassed repeated protests from the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the regional exchanges, which were concerned that some firms, finding the regulations too burdensome, might choose to delist and trade over the counter. Decades later, in 1955, the SEC mandated semiannual reports, based on the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, followed by the requirement for quarterly reporting in 1971. 1 Ever since, researchers have aimed at examining sense and consequences of disclosure regulation.
The ongoing discourse on reporting regulation is reflected by many current debates all over the globe:
Along with new rules for transparency, the European Union (EU) recently discussed whether or not to require financial quarterly reports from companies listed in the member states. The proposals were refused, but companies in the EU are now required to provide qualitative quarterly reports, that describe the firms' business trends and outlook (see Tassel (2003) for a discussion). Similarly, in the US an increasing corporate revolution against too timely disclosure with respect to quarterly earnings guidance is observable. 2 The main critique on increasing mandatory reporting frequency from a practical point of view points at disproportionate costs, which are particularly painful when companies do not experience any benefits.
Opponents argue that if benefits would arise, managers would provide the appropriate disclosure level including interim reports voluntarily. This is also one of the main arguments of Porsche AG, presumably 1 See Butler et al. (2005) for further details on U.S. disclosure regulation. the most famous opponent against interim reporting regulation. In 2001 Porsche was excluded from Germany's Mid Cap Dax (MDAX) for refusing to provide quarterly reports. The German stock exchange had introduced a rule that required quarterly reporting for all companies listed in one of the Dax indices.
As Porsche did not intend to comply with those rules, it was excluded from the respective index and is currently not included in the Prime Segment but rather in the less attractive general segment of Deutsche Börse. In 2003 Porsche filed lawsuit against Deutsche Börse claiming that the reporting requirement was illegal. Its main argument was that too timely interim reporting focuses investors' attention to short term prospects which induces greater volatility and thus higher cost of capital. Porsche lost its case in 2007.
The debate on requiring financial interim reporting is clearly a debate on disclosure regulation. Why should interim reporting be obliged? In contrast to the very traditional justification for accounting policy, which is a moralistic approach that targets for example the concept of fairness and fraud protection, Lev (1988) develops a concept of "equity-orientation of disclosure regulation". Inequity, he argues, results in asymmetric information. A regulation that targets equity in capital markets is therefore effective if it successfully decreases information asymmetry. Following that argument, we test whether a regulation that targets increasing mandatory interim reporting successfully decreases information asymmetry.
While economic rationale suggests that higher transparency is associated with lower information asymmetry, empirical research has provided mixed evidence. A reasonable explanation is that the disclosure environment of investigated samples is already rich and therefore information asymmetry low (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) ). Investigating the regulatory impact of mandatory reporting frequency should therefore consider a market with an overall relatively low disclosure level.
We investigate the Swiss stock market, a market in which very recently in 1997 interim reporting became mandatory and which holds a promising setting to investigate the connection between transparency and information asymmetry. We examine the impact of mandatory interim reporting on information asymmetry among investors as well as among financial analysts. While there has been extensive research on the effectiveness of increasing voluntary disclosure levels, we contribute to the debate on interim reporting by providing new evidence for the impacts of greater mandatory reporting. Most importantly, our results fuel the debate on the question whether firms should be obliged to report more frequently, or whether the decision of interim reporting frequency should be left to companies themselves. As economists and following the argument above, our answer is: It depends whether it helps investors by successfully decreasing information asymmetry. We argue that firms may report infrequently for two reasons: Firstly, because they do not care about increased transparency or want to keep information privately --then regulation should in fact help decreasing information asymmetry. Secondly managers may simply know that interim reporting is not related to lower information asymmetry or richer information environments in their specific situation. In fact, here we should not find an impact of greater mandatory reporting frequency. While we do find some support on positive effects of mandatory interim reporting on information asymmetry, overall our results stronger support the second argument suggesting that requiring interim reports partly fails to decrease information asymmetry.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Previous research in the area of reporting frequency and its impact on information asymmetry is reviewed in section 2. We develop our research design in section 3 and describe the sample in section 4. Results are presented in section 5 and some further analyses arising from our results are provided in section 6. Conclusions are drawn in section 7.
Prior Research
Corporate disclosure subsumes 1) disclosure through regulated financial reports, 2) firms' voluntary disclosure (management forecasts, conference calls, etc.) and 3) disclosure about the firm through information intermediaries (financial analysts, press, etc.) (Healy and Palepu (2001) p. 406). The disclosure through interim reports falls into the first category if these reports are required by regulation, but into the second category if provided voluntarily.
The question arising is: why should companies provide financial reports at all? And why would it be necessary to require greater interim reporting frequency by law?
The demand for financial disclosure in general is caused by information asymmetries and the arising agency conflicts between managers and investors (Healy and Palepu (2001) and Leftwich et al. (1981) ).
However, the role assigned specifically to interim reports in reducing information asymmetry is still a controversy in literature.
As Lev (1988) notes, disclosure regulation is desirable if it reduces inequity 3 in capital markets since "(…) inequity in capital markets resulting from information asymmetry can and does occur, and (…) its social consequences in the form of high transaction costs, thin markets, low liquidity and, in general decreased gain from trade, are indeed very undesirable" (Lev (1988) , p. 3). Less transparent firms do indeed experience greater information asymmetry and market illiquidity, measured by bid-ask spreads (Welker (1995) ). This, however, does not answer the question whether firms should be obliged to provide interim reports. Firms may already provide additional information which they find more efficient in their specific situation, even if not publishing financial interim reports. Thus they still might have a high disclosure ranking, but they presume it as more valuable to provide information through other channels than providing interim financial reports. The question, whether a certain kind of disclosure should be mandated is thus not addressed by investigating the relationship between disclosure levels and information asymmetry. In fact Gigler and Hemmer (1998) document that requiring reporting frequency may even reduce the informational efficiency since more frequent interim reports may simply reduce or even eliminate voluntary disclosure that may have delivered better (more precise) indicators for the firm's value. This is also argued by Butler et al. (2005) , who document that the switch to mandatory quarterly reporting in the US in 1970 did not improve the timeliness of accounting information.
Consequently, information asymmetry is not necessarily reduced. Rather by requiring (more frequent) interim reports, the overall transparency of the firm might even be reduced.
Providing corporate transparency is obviously a question of its cost-benefit-tradeoff That is, firms evaluate whether benefit associated a specific disclosure outweigh its costs.. A regulatory body that aims at requiring disclosing information through a certain channel -such as financial interim reports -must therefore be aware of the factors motivating firms not to provide this disclosure voluntarily.
Benefits
Various benefits are associated to higher reporting frequency. Interim reporting lowers agency costs, since investors can monitor the management better (Yee (2004) ). Furthermore, early research in the area of reporting frequency examined the forecasting value of interim reports by constructing different predictors for the annual EPS based on the first quarter interim figures and comparing them to predictors based on the previous year EPS only. No significant difference in those predictors could be found suggesting that first quarter results have no forecasting value for the annual EPS (Green and Segall (1967) ). However, when reinvestigating this issue by considering additional information, namely second, third-, and fourthquarter results and by constructing additional predictors based on those figures, it could be concluded that interim reports are useful for forecasting annual EPS (Brown and Niederhoffer (1968) ). Recent studies also provide evidence that analysts and investors receive more timely information and are able to predict the future value of the firm better. There is indeed evidence for the usefulness and importance of interim reports on analyst revisions and the improvement of their earnings forecasts of the same year (Brown and Rozeff (1979) ). From this point of view, information is incorporated into stock prices more frequently, which leads to an increase in stock market efficiency (see Yee (2004) ). Butler et al. (2005) test the effect of disclosure on timeliness and show that annual earnings information is impounded into prices more quickly for firms that report quarterly compared to firms that report semiannually. They explain that "reporting frequency is expected to affect intra-period timeliness directly because as interim earnings reports become more frequent, the information in annual earnings is anticipated sooner" (Butler et al. (2005) , p. x). Therefore, it can be expected that the level of interim information reduces uncertainty in the market and consequently the absolute value of the earnings surprise at the announcement date decreases.
When examining the association between the level of interim information and the stock returns around the annual announcement of the firm, Shores (1990) defines the level of interim information not as the reporting frequency, but rather as "information that alters investors' beliefs about attributes that cause securities to be of value and that is publicly available prior to the announcement of annual earnings". He documents, that interim reports preempt information content of annual earnings. When examining the impact of interim reporting on the return variability around annual announcement dates, it can even further be concluded that interim reporting preempt information of annual reports (McNichols and Manegold (1983) ). Finally, benefits of increased disclosure are improved liquidity by reducing information asymmetries among traders (Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) , Yee (2004) ), and lower cost of capital (Botosan (1997) ).
Costs
Increasing the financial disclosure levels is, however, not only accompanied by benefits -especially, higher disclosure frequency must necessarily reduce information asymmetry. When considering monthly sales reporting in the US retail sector (the frequency of sales data information differs among firms), there is in fact no significant impact of disclosure frequency on the level of information asymmetry and the stock price informativeness (Van Buskirk (2005) ).
Direct costs arising from disclosure are self-explanatory, such as the fact that an increase in corporate reports is associated to greater administrative costs and additional investments in the firm's accounting systems, so called "out-of-the-pocket-costs" (Leftwich et al. (1981) ). However, there are further indirect costs associated to disclosure: The reliability of information may be sacrificed in exchange to timeliness.
Short period information, it is argued, is even stronger based on estimation and judgments and suffers from seasonality and randomness. It may thus not appropriately represent the firm's financial situation and regulators must ensure not only timeliness but more importantly reliability of published information (Leftwich et al. (1981) , Gan (1999) and Sang and Kiong (2003) (p. 5).
Yee (2004) further argues that increased reporting frequency forces firms to provide more information not only to investors, but also to competitors, which reduces information asymmetry among competitive firms and affects the competition itself (see also Leftwich et al. (1981) ). Regarding the effect of increased reporting frequency on analyst expenditures on information, Yee (2004) notes that on the one hand, costs for information access decreases through reduced information asymmetry, and on the other hand, more frequent information provoke additional analysts and information intermediaries to follow the firm, which, overall, increases social costs.
The discussion on the tradeoff between costs and benefits associated to corporate disclosure highlights the fact that the effectiveness of disclosure regulation is not necessarily given by the fact that disclosure has in general positive effects for investors. The question is, whether there may be no positive effects of this specific kind of disclosure for the firms affected and/or whether costs associated to providing information through this specific channel (picked by regulation) motivate managers to reduce other voluntary disclosure, which in fact might even reduce the overall transparency of the firm.
Research Design
We perform the analysis regarding the effectiveness of requiring financial interim reports in the Swiss stock market. We will briefly introduce the implementation of semi-annual reporting in Switzerland in section 3.1. We will then develop our hypothesis on the impacts of mandatory interim reports on different proxies for information asymmetry in section 3.2. Finally, the estimated regressions as well as the expected signs on coefficients will be presented in section 3.3.
Regulation of Financial Reporting in Switzerland
As mentioned, Switzerland provides an interesting setting to investigate the impact from mandatory interim reporting on information asymmetry and capital markets uncertainty, since semi-annual reporting was introduced not before 1997. 4 The general disclosure level has not been particularly high to that point.
If regulation does have an impact on information asymmetry we are therefore likely to reveal it, since the marginal impact of any disclosure instrument is likely to by higher if the overall disclosure level is relatively low. 
Hypothesis Development
We examine the usefulness of greater mandatory reporting frequency by investigating its effectiveness of increasing the firms' information environment, reflected by lower information asymmetry. Thus, the following general hypothesis is stated:
7 Until January 2003, the minimum content requirement for the interim financial reports was Swiss GAAP ARR (Accounting and Reporting Regulations), also for issuers, who applied IFRS or US-GAAP in their annual report. (2005) and Leftwich et al. (1981) for the history of the regulation of financial reporting frequency in the US.
HA1: After introducing an interim report as required by regulation, mandatory reporters have (i) a more comprehensive information environment and (ii) experience a decrease in information asymmetry.
Testing for this general hypothesis requires measures for firms' information environment and information asymmetry. We use four different proxies, namely two variables that measure information asymmetry reflected by financial analysts (forecast accuracy and analyst following) and two variables that measure information asymmetry reflected directly by the stock market (spread and turnover).
For every proxy we measure the change in uncertainty for each single firm from one year to another and test for the factors that significantly influence such a changes in uncertainty. The key explanatory variable --which is supposed to capture the effect based on the new Listing Rules --is an indicator variable labeled INTERIM equal to one if an interim report has been issued in the specific year and zero otherwise. Table   3 provides the values for the variable INTERIM for our example firms.
[INSERT Our main objective is to measure whether changes in uncertainty of mandatory reporters are significant in the year in which the first mandatory interim report is published.
The following multivariate regressions are tested for each proxy:
Note that ∆INTERIM it equals one for the year in which a mandatory reporter firstly introduces an interim report and zero otherwise. ∆INTERIM i , t-1 is the lagged variable based on ∆INTERIM it . We control for other explanatory factors x n that influence uncertainty changes, such as size, performance, etc. as explained below.
Financial analysts uncertainty
When the disclosure level is low, information asymmetry and thus forecast difficulty for financial analysts increases. Our two proxies reflecting this mechanism are the forecast error and analyst following.
Forecast Error

Key explanatory variable INTERIM:
If the regulation successfully decreases information asymmetry, analysts will gain additional information for their forecasting activity and will thus be more likely to accurately forecast earnings. We measure the forecast error (ERROR) as the absolute difference between actual earnings per share (EPS) and forecasted EPS, deflated by the stock price. If the regulation is effective, we expect ERROR to decrease for mandatory reporters after introducing the required interim report. A positive impact of detailed disclosure on forecast accuracy has been documented e.g. by Bushman and Smith (2001) and Lang and Lundholm (1996) . The following one-sided alternative hypothesis is stated.
H1a (alternative form): Mandatory reporters experience lower analysts' forecast errors after required interim reporting is implemented, i.e. the coefficient on
∆INTERIM it is significantly negative.
Other explanatory variables: Prior research has documented significant relationships between ERROR and firm size, forecast uncertainty, losses and analyst following.
Larger firms have richer information environments (Atiase (1985) , Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Mohd (2005), we therefore expect firms size (SIZE) to be negatively associated with forecast error. Further, there is a likely relation between forecast difficulty about a firm's future prospects and analysts' earnings forecast accuracy. For example, Ackert and Athanassakos (1997) find that when forecast difficulty is high, financial analysts have fewer reputational concerns and consequently produce over-optimistic earnings forecasts and thus larger forecast errors. Moreover, Alford and Berger (1999) document a significantly negative impact of volatility on forecast accuracy and measure difficulty as an outcome of a short and a long term component. We control for both in order to distinguish between short term uncertainty (change in earnings relative to the previous year (SURP)) and long term uncertainty (5-year standard deviation in the firm's Return on Assets (stdROA)). Both, short and long term components are expected to be positively related based on prior research. It has further been documented that analysts tend to forecast losses with significantly lower accuracy (Mohanram and Sunder (2003) and Heflin et al. (2003) ). We therefore expect firms that publish a loss (LOSS) to have greater analyst forecast errors. Finally, although many authors do not include analyst following in a model to measure forecast accuracy, Alford and Berger (1999) document a positive association between greater analyst following and forecast accuracy. They argue that greater analyst following increases expenditures spent for information gathering and thus increases the information available to analysts. We therefore include the number of analysts (ANALYST) as variation of the model.
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Analyst Following
Key explanatory variable INTERIM: Regarding the causality between analyst following (ANALYST) and disclosure it can still be discussed whether a company followed by more analysts is characterized by a higher or lower disclosure level. It might be argued, that greater disclosure levels reduce analysts'
competitive information advantage and thus lowers analyst reports' supply (i.e. lower analyst following) 9 As described in more detail in section 3.3, we construct a Simultaneous Equations Model to control for simultaneity between ANALYST and ERROR. Both OLS-results (without the covariate ANALYST) and 2SLS estimates are reported. (Hope (2003) , Lang et al. (2003) ). More disclosure also might reduce the demand for analyst reports as investors are able to gain information directly from the firm (Lang and Lundholm (1996) , Healy and Palepu (2001)). However, the opposite association between disclosure level and analyst following is reasonable as well. As Bhushan (1989) shows, an increased disclosure level implies lower information gathering costs for analysts and thus greater incentives to follow the respective firm. Firms with greater analyst ratings of disclosure experience an increase in analyst following up to the same level as their industry peers (Healy et al. (1999) ). It is even argued that analysts actively demand information regarding upcoming events in order to provide accurate forecasts, since they depend on their track records. If management does not provide the demanded information level, analysts may simply drop coverage (Hutton (2006) ). Additional information provided by firms is therefore not a substitute for analyst reports but rather may be more valuable to investors (Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Butler et al. (2005) ). Hence (and in contrast to the argument above), investors' demand for analyst reports can be expected to increase as well.
The net effect of higher disclosure on analyst following remains uncertain, wherefore we test the following two-sided Null hypothesis:
H1b (null form): There is no change in analyst following for mandatory reporters after the implementation of higher reporting frequency, i.e. the coefficient on ∆INTERIM it is not significantly different from zero.
Other covariates: Bhushan (1989) , Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Mohanram and Sunder (2003) document a significant positive relationship between firm size (SIZE) and analyst following. We use market value as a proxy for firm size. We further control for trading volume (VOLUME). Greater trading volume reflects greater trading activity of uninformed investors who are likely to increasingly demand financial analyst reports. Therefore we expect a significant positive impact of trading volume on analyst following as documented by Alford and Berger (1999) . Lang and Lundholm (1996) document a slightly negative relationship between long term variability in firm performance and analyst following. We control for this impact with the 5-year variability in ROA (stdROA). In order to incorporate short term variability of performance we include the relative EPS-difference of two adjacent years (SURP) as presented in section 0 and proposed by Lang and Lundholm (1995) . Finally, the stock return of the previous year was included to measure the impact of firm performance on the number of analysts (see for example Walther and Willis (1999), and Ireni and Karamanou (2003)).
Stock Market's Uncertainty
Our second investigation regarding the impact of greater mandatory reporting frequency on firms' information environment considers the stock market's uncertainty. Following Mohd (2005) , we use two variables to proxy for information asymmetry in the stock market: bid-ask spreads and share turnover.
Bid-Ask Spreads
Key explanatory variable INTERIIM: The bid-ask spread (SPREAD) is a common variable that is supposed to proxy for differences in information levels between informed (insider) investors and liquidity traders (Demsetz (1968) and Bagehot (1971) cited in Sunder (2002)). In order to offset losses that result from trading with informed investors, market makers widen the bid-ask spread. Those losses increase with distinct information asymmetry, thus the bid-ask spread is greater for firms with higher information asymmetry (Sunder (2002) ). Since we hypothesize that information asymmetry decreases for mandatory reporters through the requirement of interim reporting, we expect the bid-ask spread to decrease after the regulation becomes effective. The following (one-sided) alternative hypothesis is tested:
H1c (alternative form): Mandatory reporters experience a lower average bid-askspread after the switch to interim reporting, i.e. the coefficient on ∆INTERIM it is significantly negative.
Other covariates: The vast majority of prior research estimates spread along with an simultaneous equation model (SEM) (see for example Sunder (2002) , Roulstone (2003) and Heflin et al. (2005) ).
Following Mohd (2005) we therefore incorporate our variables that proxy for stock information asymmetry into an SEM with both a price dimension using SPREAD and a quantitative dimension using share turnover (TRNVR). Firms with greater share turnover are expected to have lower bid-ask spreads (Sunder (2002) ). Prior research has documented that a firm's bid-ask spread is determined by firm size (SIZE). Precisely, larger firms are characterized by more comprehensive information environments (as argued above in the financial analyst context). We therefore expect firm size to be negatively associated with bid-ask spread. Moreover, we control for stock price volatility (stdP) as a measure for uncertainty which motivates market makers to widen the spread (Sunder (2002) , Mohd (2005) , Heflin et al. (2005) ).
We further control for the absolute stock price (PRICE). Previous research has documented a significantly negative relationship between stock price and spread, which is of mechanical nature born from the discrete tick sizes (Welker (1995) , (Sunder (2002) , Mohd (2005) , Heflin et al. (2005) ). Finally, we include trading volume (VOLUME) as proposed by Venkatesch and Chiang (1986) to allow for the difficulty to reverse a position. We expect a negative relationship between VOLUME and SPREAD.
Share Turnover
Key explanatory variable INTERIM:
The share turnover (TRNVR) on the other hand decreases with information asymmetry, since uninformed investors will stop trading these shares in order to avoid losses (Mohd (2005) We further control for shares outstanding (SHRSOUT) as Welker (1995) argues that firms with a greater amount of shares outstanding have a greater trading volume due to a broader investment base. Finally, we control for exchange listing (following Mohd (2005)) and expect a higher trading volume for firms which are listed in the U.S. (US) since these shares are traded in a broader field.
Estimated Regressions
Regressions Addressing Financial Analysts' Uncertainty
Based on the preceding sections, we use the following two OLS-regressions to measure a potential impact from mandatory semiannual reports on the uncertainty of financial analysts. As an extension and test of robustness, we also estimate regressions (1) and (2) as a Simultaneous Equations Model (SEM), since some previous models have documented simultaneity between ERROR and ANALYST 10 . All regressions where estimated using first differencing as reflected by the symbol "∆":
(1) ∆ERROR it = δ 0 + β 1 ∆INTERIM it + β 2 ∆INTERIM i , t-1 + β 3 ∆SIZE it + β 4 ∆SURP it + β 5 ∆stdROA it + β 6 ∆LOSS it + yeardummies + ∆u it 10 Note that the SEM equations are not listed below. Yet they are basically identical with the variable ERROR and ANALYST, respectively, as additional regressors.
(2) In summary, we expect the following signs for the above described covariates in regressions (1) and (2) (these expectations correspond to column (1) in Table 7) 11 :
(1) ∆ERROR it : β 1 < 0, β 2 < 0, β 3 < 0, β 4 > 0, β 5 > 0 and β 6 > 0 (2) ∆ANALYST it : β 1 = ?, β 2 = ?, β 3 > 0, β 4 < 0, β 5 < 0 and β 6 > 0
Regressions Addressing Stock Market's Uncertainty
Based on previous research, we estimate the following two regressions in an SEM setting to control for endogeneity. We did not perform OLS estimates since the vast majority of established models treats information asymmetry in a simultaneous system with both a price dimension (reflected by SPREAD) and a quantitative dimension (reflected by TRNVR) (see for example Sunder (2002) , Heflin et al. (2005) or
Mhod (2005)).
11 Where "< 0" and "> 0" denote one-sided hypotheses and "= ?" are two-sided hypotheses (3) ∆SPREAD it = δ 0 + β 1 ∆INTERIM it + β 2 ∆INTERIM i,t-1 + β 3 ∆TRNVR it + β 4 ∆SIZE it + β 5 ∆stdP it + β 6 ∆PRICE it + β 7 ∆VOLUME it + yeardummies + ∆u it (4) ∆TRNVR it = δ 0 + β 1 ∆INTERIM it + β 2 ∆INTERIM i,t-1 + β 3 ∆SPREAD it + β 4 ∆SIZE it + β 5 ∆SHRSOUT it + β 6 ∆US it + yeardummies + ∆u it where: Summarized, we expect the following signs for regressions (3) and (4) (these expectations correspond to column (1) in Table 8 ) 12 :
(3) ∆SPREAD it : β 1 < 0, β 2 < 0, β 3 < 0, β 4 < 0, β 5 > 0, β 6 < 0 and β 7 < 0 (4) ∆TRNVR it : β 1 > 0, β 2 > 0, β 3 = ?, β 4 > 0 and β 5 < 0
Estimation Methods
All regressions were estimated in differences rather than levels to control for unobserved firm-fixed effects and autocorrelation. Regressions (1) and (2) --containing the forecast-error and the number of analysts as dependent variables --were estimated by OLS in a first step since a test for endogeneity indicated exogenous regressors. However, earlier work suggests estimating the forecast error and the number of analysts as a simultaneous equation system (SEM) (see for example Alford and Berger (1999) ).
Therefore, we estimate the above-mentioned regressions with 2SLS in order to account for potential simultaneity, serving as a variation and test of robustness.
2SLS was applied for regressions (3) and (4) 
Sample
We briefly introduce the dataset and its sources in section 4.1 and provide the relevant descriptive statistics in section 4.2
Data
Following the research setting outlined earlier, reporting frequency and financial data were obtained for 1992 to 2001 (10 years). Regarding interim reporting frequency data on Swiss companies are not available on I/B/E/S on a reliable basis. Moreover, neither the SWX nor, as to our knowledge, any other dataprovider in Switzerland collects data on interim reporting frequency in Switzerland. The Swiss Stock Guide 13 does provide the frequency of interim reporting of Swiss Companies, although this data is not collected electronically within a historical database. We thus hand collected data on interim reporting frequency for firms in the Main Segment from the annual booklet. In order to check the reliability of the interim frequency obtained from this guide, we also collected data on the frequency of interim reporting of Swiss companies through the Power Plus Pro Tool of Reuters, which allows single Time Series Requests on Companies' Financial Reports and returns the period end dates for which financial (annual or interim)
reports were available. We compare those two datasets for every firm year in the sample and clean the dataset by obtaining additional information from the respective firm websites.
13 The Swiss Stock Guide is published on an annual basis and contains detailed information on Swiss companies.
Financial data was obtained from Thomson ONE Banker which allows simultaneous requests from diverse databases. All data used in this study originate either from I/B/E/S, Datastream or Worldscope.
After obtaining the data, we imposed the following restrictions to harmonize our sample: We dropped all companies that where not listed on the SWX Main Segment during the implementation period. Moreover, all firms with other than final reporting as of December 31 were deleted to ensure comparability of our sample firms. Finally, all companies which did not have at least one year of financial data available in the switching period and one year after 1997 were dropped as well.
In order to investigate the effects from mandatory interim reporting, we split our sample into a control and a treatment group, i.e. into groups of voluntary and mandatory reporters. As mentioned earlier, the law was passed in the middle of 1995 after an extensive debate. Therefore, we classify firms as voluntary reporters if interim reports were issued before 1995. That is, we classify increased interim reporting frequency before 1995 as truly voluntary. Otherwise the company is considered to be a mandatory reporter who increased its reporting frequency due to the enforcement of the new regulation. The switching year is the first year of the higher reporting frequency. Table 4 represents the number of companies included in our sample, split into two groups according to their reporting status described above. While the first column contains the total number of firm-years collected, the second and third columns provide information on the number of voluntary and mandatory reporters, respectively. The last column contains the number of voluntary reporters that switched in the specific year due to the new regulation.
Descriptive Statistics Sample Overview
[INSERT Table 4 : Sample Selection]
Our sample consists of 39 mandatory reporters increasing their reporting frequency in the switching period. Interestingly, the majority of firms issued their first interim report in 1995, the year in which the new law was passed, or in the year in which the regulation became effective 14 . Eight firms increased their reporting frequency after the implementation date for unknown reasons. Thus we extended the switching period for one year, i.e. from 1995 to 1999.
All companies entering the sample in or after 1995 were considered as mandatory reporters, since no data was available to ensure a voluntary reporting status. Exceptions were made for two newcomers who 14 Since all our sample firms issued their final reports as at December 31, interim reports had to be issued at the latest in the fiscal year 1998. entered the sample after an M&A-Transaction of companies who published interim reports before 1995.
Note however, that not all listed firm years in Table 3 could be used in the regressions below due to estimation by first-differencing, the use of lagged covariates and missing data for some of the required variables. Therefore, the number of observations in the table differs from the number of observations used in the regressions below. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for the two sub-samples (mandatory and voluntary reporters) based on a two sample t-Test. In order to investigate differences between the two groups of voluntary and mandatory reporters, t-Tests for the listed variables were performed before and after the new law (Panel A and B respectively). Furthermore, the differences between the pre-and post-period were computed for the specific variables and tested as well (Panel C). For mandatory reporters only those firm-years were included, which correspond to the reporting characteristics of the period, that is, those years with no interim reports in the pre-period and those years in which interim reports were published in the postperiod.
Two Sample t-Tests
[INSERT In the period after the introduction of the regulation the difference in size is not significant any more.
However, the number of analysts, the number of shares outstanding and the cross listing variable are still significantly higher for voluntary reporters. Moreover, voluntary reporters where facing a higher share turnover (0.208%) and a larger trading volume (on average 623 shares/day). The long term measure for uncertainty is still higher for voluntary reporters after the regulation became effective. Although a more detailed discussion will follow later, this finding supports the argument that mandatory reporters do not issue interim reports due to the fact that they already have less uncertainty also without issuing additional financial reports.
The difference for the two periods reveals on the one hand a significant difference in the change of the number of analysts: While the number of analysts following a voluntary reporter decreased 4.096 on average the counterpart for mandatory reporters diminished less (1.714 on average). On the other hand the price volatility remained almost unchanged for voluntary reporters and decreased slightly for mandatory reporters. One could therefore argue that the new Listing Rules helped to lower uncertainty for mandatory reporters on a rather marginal basis. Table 6 reports the Pearson correlations among the variables described above 15 . Following Panel A the two highest correlations are 86.2% between SHRSOUT and VOLUME and 78% between stdEPS and PRICE. However, these variable combinations are not included in one regression simultaneaously and therefore are not subject to multicollinearity. On the other hand, the third and forth highest correlations among SIZE and SHRSOUT as well as SIZE and SPREAD will be included in one regression as outlined in section 3.3. As a consequence we performed robustness tests in the form of alternative regressions in order to control for possible impacts due to multicollinearity.
Correlation
[INSERT Table 6 : Correlation Matrix]
Results
As discussed above we use four different proxies to measure information asymmetry. We present our results regarding the impacts of mandatory interim reporting on financial analysts' uncertainty in section 5.1, followed by the respective impacts on the stock market's uncertainty measures in section 5.2.
The regulations impact on financial analysts' uncertainty
[INSERT Table 7 : Analysts' Uncertainty]
Forecast Error
Our first dependent variable -the EPS forecast-error -reflects the quality of the information environment by measuring the accuracy of analysts EPS-forecasts. Results on this regression are provided in Table 7 column 2 and 3. (2003)). The endogenous ANALYST regressor is not significant and therefore not further commented.
Analyst Following
The number of analysts following is another proxy for the richness of the information environment and indicates an enhancement due to the new interim reporting: All key explanatory variables (INTERIM) are significantly positively related to ANALYST, meaning that after publishing semiannual reports for the first time, the number of analysts increases by 8 to 9% for the actual and the subsequent year. Moreover, the INTERIM and LAG_INTERIM are also jointly significant on a 10%-level, which is also supported by the univariate analysis in Table 5 (two sample t-tests). Therefore, we clearly reject our hypothesis H1b, since we find a significant impact from the new Listing Rules on the number of analyst following a company and conclude that the implementation of the regulation obviously increased the quality of the information environment for analysts.
All other significant covariates are in line with previous research: ANALYST is significantly determined by the size of a company (+0.11% and +0.16, respectively for a 1% larger firm). Previous literature has found a negative connection between short-term (SURP) and long-term (stdROA) measures of forecast difficulty and the number of analysts: As expected we also find a negative relationship, although with a rather small economic effect. Firm profits indicate a notably small effect on the number of analysts, but with the sign as expected. Again, we do not find a significant impact from the endogenous regressor (ERROR) on the dependent variable.
The regulations impact on the stock market's uncertainty
[INSERT Table 8 : Markets' Uncertainty]
Bid-Ask Spreads
As mentioned above the estimate for the yearly average of daily relative bid-ask-spreads was conducted using a 2SLS estimation procedure. Similarly to the results of the ERROR regression, we find a small impact from the implementation of mandated interim reports: The information asymmetry -as measured by SPREAD -is lowered in the year of implementation. Namely, the issuance of a first interim report decreased the bid-ask spread by about 8.4%. Again, a test of joint significance does not support a significant impact and therefore one could question if the new Listing Rules helped to reduce information asymmetry. Nevertheless we do not reject our hypothesis H1c, since we find some evidence to support it.
The other significant covariates do indicate the expected associations: The endogenous regressor TRNVR is significantly negative related to the bid-ask spread: If turnover increases by 1%, the spread decreases by about 0.41%. Larger firms seem to have lower information asymmetry (a 0.15% smaller spread for a 1% larger company) and higher stock price uncertainty of 1% is reflected by a 0.1% larger spread. The stock price is negatively related with SPREAD, although only significant on a 10%-level. These finding is in line with previous literature (see for example Sunder (2002) ).
Share Turnover
Yearly averages of daily share-turnover as our last proxy for measuring information asymmetry is the counterpart of the SEM mentioned above. Here, we do not find any impact from the new Listing Rules on the information asymmetry: both INTERIM and LAG_INTERIM are not significant on a reasonably significance level. We therefore reject the corresponding hypothesis H1d. Together with the results above, this finding casts doubt on a prominent influence from the regulation on the information environment and asymmetry.
Except for one covariate (SIZE), all explanatory variables do indicate associations as expected: First, the endogenous regressor SPREAD is negatively related to TRNVR: a 1% increase of the spread reduces the share turnover about 4.2%. Further, the two stage least square estimate indicates a negative relationship between firm size and share-turnover, what is not in line with our expectations. The number of shares outstanding is positively related to the turnover what supports the finding of Welker (1995) , who argues that firms with a greater amount of shares outstanding experience a higher degree of shares traded due to a broader investment base. Finally, the indicator variable US reflects a positive association with TRNVR, meaning that a listing on a U.S. exchange raises the share turnover by about 103%.
Firm Characteristics Associated with Greater (Voluntary) Reporting Frequency
As pointed out earlier firms may report infrequently for two reasons: Firstly, because they do not care about lower information asymmetry or richer information environments, or secondly because they expect that an increasing information environment is not related to lower information asymmetry in their specific situation. The latter argument implicitly addresses the question why firms that do not provide interim reports voluntarily expect a lack of benefits. On the one hand, mandatory reporters could already be characterized by lower information asymmetry prior to the regulation. On the other hand, they might expect an insignificant impact of additional interim reports on a firms' information environment --why would firms provide costly interim reports on a voluntary basis if those would not significantly reduce information asymmetry in the firm's specific situation?
In this section we therefore aim to answer the question which firm characteristics motivate companies to provide interim reports voluntarily. The previous section documented that requiring interim reports had not the expected reducing effect on information asymmetry of mandatory reporters. The question arising is, whether mandatory reporters are already characterized by lower information asymmetry, even without publishing an interim report. It has already been argued in section 2 that mandatory disclosure might substitute disclosure channels exploited voluntarily by managers. That is, firms that are required to provide additional disclosure decide to stop providing transparency through other channels and thus the overall disclosure level remains unaffected. This might explain why we find no significant impact on information asymmetry. In order to investigate the finding further, we examine how mandatory and voluntary reporters differ.
H2: Mandatory reporters have lower information asymmetry than voluntary reporters.
In order to test this hypothesis, we examine whether the decision to provide interim reports voluntarily before the regulation was adopted was motivated by greater information asymmetry.
We estimate the following Probit-regression for the subperiod 1994-1997 by modeling the probability of interim reporting. We include firm size (proxied by market value) and expect that larger firms are more likely to provide interim reports voluntarily for the following reasons. On the one hand, larger firms are more complex, wherefore a higher disclosure level can be expected, suggesting that firms provide more information if forecasting is more difficult. Further, disclosure costs can be expected to be decreasing with firm size, causing increased disclosure levels for larger firms (Lang and Lundholm (1993) ). Our results from section 5.1 support the finding by Healy et al. (1999) , who document greater analyst following for higher disclosure rankings. Following the causation given by Hutton (2006) , who claims that analysts even demand information regarding upcoming events in order to provide accurate forecasts, we expect that greater analyst following is more likely to be associated to voluntary reporters. Financial leverage is positively related to the firm's agency costs and hence increases the monitoring costs. Those monitoring costs can be reduced by an increase in disclosure. Firms with higher financial leverage therefore have greater benefits from higher reporting frequency (Leftwich et al. (1981) , and Butler et al. (2005) ). This suggests that the firm's financial leverage is positively associated with the likelihood to provide interim reports voluntarily.
We estimate the following Probit-model:
Where SIZE, ANALYST, SPREAD, TRNV, LVRG, stdevROA and US are variables already described in the earlier models as the market capitalization at year-end, the number of analysts following a company, the yearly average of the daily relative bid-ask-spread, the share turnover computed as the ratio of stock trading-volume to average shares outstanding at year-end, the leverage, the standard deviation of the Return on Assets for the last five years and a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed in the U.S..
The variable DISPERSION denotes the average variance from the EPS-forecast mean and leverage is ratio of total debt (i.e. short-and long-term) to total assets. Finally, the US is a dummy variable that equals one if a company was listed in the US for the corresponding firm-year and zero otherwise.
[INSERT Table 9 : Probit results]
As evident from Table 9 several variables indicate a positive marginal effect on the probability of issuing an interim report. Before interpreting the results, it is important to note two things. Firstly, all variables included in Table 9 are lagged, since we investigate which firm characteristics are associated with voluntary reporting. Therefore, voluntary reporting is viewed as the "outcome" of the variables in the probit-model. Secondly, the table above represents the marginal effects for each individual in the sample, what is different form the traditional approach to compute marginal effects of an average individual after estimating using probit. Thus, we are describing average marginal effects rather than the marginal effects of an average individual. Table 9 reveals that a marginal increase in size corresponds -on average -to a 16% higher probability of issuing an interim report, meaning that larger companies tend to report voluntarily more often. Moreover, we find a higher demand for reporting corresponding with a larger influence from stake holders: on average, a marginal increase of the number of analyst and the ratio of debt to total-assets provide, a company will report on a voluntary basis wither a 17% and 59% higher probability, respectively. Finally, the degree of information asymmetry and the quality of the information environment plays an important role regarding the decision to report voluntary: A marginal higher degree of information asymmetry -as measured by the bid-ask spread -raises the probability of voluntary reporting by about 22%, whereas a 3% higher probability is associated with a marginal increase of uncertainty in the information environment, measured by the EPS-forecast standard deviation. This finding supports the theory that companies have incentives to reduce the degree of information asymmetry. Contradictory to these findings is the marginal change in share-turnover, however, slightly significant on a 10% level only.
Conclusion
The ongoing debate on the effects and benefits of mandatory interim reports remains controversial, despite its long perdurability. Supporters of disclosure regulation point at main benefits such as the reduction of information asymmetries among participants in the capital market and the prevention of fraud. On the contrary, opponents doubt the usefulness and effectiveness given the costs accompanied by increased reporting frequency. Supporting the notion that mandating interim financial reports does not outweigh its costs inevitably results in questioning material parts of today's disclosure regulations.
Our research examines the relation between disclosure regulation and information asymmetry by analyzing the impact of the introduction of mandatory interim reporting in the Main Segment of the Swiss Exchange (SWX). Theory predicts that increased disclosure reduces information asymmetry. Increasing mandatory disclosure may, however, fail to reduce information asymmetry if (1) financial reports are not the major information source for capital markets, (2) the information content of financial reports does not precisely reflect the current state and true value of a firm, or (3) mandatory interim reporting discourages or displaces voluntary information resulting in a zero sum game. The implementation of the SWX listing rules is a setting well suited for examining whether the application of mandatory interim reports reduce information asymmetry.
Using the EPS-forecast error and the number of analyst following as proxies for uncertainty among financial analysts and the relative bid-ask spread and share turnover as proxies for information asymmetry in the stock market, we find some marginal evidence that the introduction of the new SWX Listing Rules helped to increase transparency. Notably, the number of analysts significantly increased for mandatory reporters after issuing semiannual reports. Only slightly significant impacts on the forecast error and the bid-ask spread have been documented. Finally, the share turnover was not affected by the regulation.
Altogether, we find mixed evidence regarding the impact on our proxy variables as a whole. Therefore one could argue that the implementation of the new Listing Rules only slightly improved or rather even failed to improve transparency in the capital market.
Further analysis indicated that firms affected by the regulation have already been characterized by lower information asymmetry prior to its implementation. This suggests that those firms have not provided interim reports on a voluntary basis prior to the new law because the need of decreasing information asymmetry was less severe. One might even suggest that those firms did provide voluntary disclosure through other channels rather than providing interim reports, because they anticipated that interim reporting would not have an impact on information asymmetry in their specific situation.
Our findings are relevant for the debate on disclosure regulation, particularly on the question whether or not to require financial interim reports by law. It is possible that our investigation of semiannual reporting Notes: The examples above provide an exemplary overview on our firm classification --if a company issued interim reports before 1995 it was considered as a voluntary reporter. Otherwise, if a first semiannual report was published in or after 1995 the firm was classified as a mandatory reporter. The switching year is the year when the first interim report was issued and therefore is only available for mandatory reporters. Furthermore, the sum of switches per year is represented by column (4) in Table 4 . For an illustration of how the effect of the switch was incorporated, see Table 3 . Notes: Note that the example firms agree with those in Table 2 . The variable of interest, named INTERIM, is an indicator variable that equals one if a company issued an interim report for the specific year and zero otherwise. For the example firms above we obtain the values as presented in Table 3 . As outlined in more detail in section 3.3, we use first differencing before estimating the regressions, wherefore the key explanatory will be "differenced away" except for the switching year. To allow for potential delayed effects from interim reports on information asymmetry, we also add a lagged interim dummy in our regressions (see section 3.3). Switches  1992  71  27  44  0  1993  71  27  44  0  1994  71  27  44  0  1995  72  27  45  11  1996  75  28  47  7  1997  81  29  52  6  1998  81  29  52  13  1999  81  29  52  8  2000  81  29  52  0  2001  81  29  52  0  TOTAL  765*  281  484  47 Notes: Column (1) provides the total number of firms for every year of our sample period, for which we collected the reporting frequency in the respective year. Column (2) represents the number of firms classified as voluntaries, column (3) represents the number of mandatory firms. Column (4) represents the number of mandatory firms that switched to interim reporting during the respective year. Remember that the regulation on interim reporting was adopted in 1995 and became effective for the fiscal year 1998. * Through the estimation with first-differencing and the use of lagged variables, we lose two years of data, i.e. around 140 firm-year observations. Moreover, through data collection from I/B/E/S and Worldscope, we loose approximately 80 firm years, due to missing data. Notes: All t-test are performed as two-sided tests and *, **, and *** denote significance at a probability level below 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. The variables are defined as follows: ERROR = averaged forecast error over 12 months (m) preceding the annual earnings announcement, defined as (| EPS t -EPS-forecast mt | / stockprice t ) ANALYST = average number of EPS forecasts over 12 months preceding the annual earnings announcement. SPREAD = yearly averages of the daily relative bid-ask spread, computed as difference between the daily bid-and ask-price divided by the average of bid-and ask. TRNVR = yearly average of daily share-trading volume divided by the average of shares outstanding. SIZE = market capitalization at the end of year t SURP = EPS surprise, defined as |EPS t -EPS t-1 |/Stockprice t-1 stdROA = standard deviation of the firm's return on assets computed over the previous 5 years stdP = standard deviation of the intra-year stock price stdEPS = standard deviation of the EPS-forecasts STKRET = stock return, defined as ((stockprice t -stockprice t-1 ) + dividends t / stockprice t-1 ) PRICE = average stock price for year t SHRSOUT = shares outstanding at year end VOLUME = average daily trading volume for year t LOSS = dummy variable, equals one if EPS is negative for year t and zero otherwise. US = dummy variable, equals one if firm is listed on a U.S. stock-exchange in year t and zero therwise LVRG = leverage, defined as debt t /total assets t 33 Notes: The table above presents the pearson correlation among all variables used. Unlike in Table 5 , the variable definition refers to the one presented in section 3.2. To detect potential outliers we compared the results above with their counterpart in the spearman correlation statistics. Since we did not identify severe differences, we do not present the spearman rank correlations. Notes: t-values are in parentheses below coefficient estimates and *, **, and *** denote significance (depending on the sign in (1), where "-" or "+" represents a one-tailed and "?" denotes a two-tailed test statistic) at a probability level below 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. All regressions where estimated with a full set of year dummies to control for year specific effects. The regressions in column (2) and (4) are estimated with OLS, whereas those in column (3) and (5) are 2SLS estimates (all F-values of the IV's are larger than 10, as proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) ) and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Moreover, the variables are defined as follows:
INTERIM Dummy variable, equals one if an interim report was issued in the specific year and zero otherwise. ERROR = Logarithm of averaged forecast error over 12 months (m) preceding the annual earnings announcement, defined as (| EPS t -EPS-forecast mt | / stockprice t ) ANALYST = Logarithm of average number of EPS forecasts over 12 months preceding the annual earnings announcement. SPREAD = Logarithm of yearly averages of the daily relative bid-ask spread, computed as difference between the daily bid-and ask-price divided by the average of bid-and ask. TRNVR = Logarithm of yearly average of daily share-trading volume divided by the average of shares outstanding. SIZE = Logarithm of market capitalization at the end of year t SURP = Logarithm of EPS surprise, defined as |EPS t -EPS t-1 |/Stockprice t-1 stdROA = Logarithm of standard deviation of the firm's return on assets computed over the previous 5 years STKRET = stock return, defined as ((stockprice t -stockprice t-1 ) + dividends t / stockprice t-1 ) LOSS = dummy variable, equals one if EPS is negative for year t and zero otherwise. Notes: t-values are in parentheses below coefficient estimates and *, **, and *** denote significance (depending on the sign in (1), where "-" or "+" represents a one-tailed and "?" denotes a two-tailed test statistic) at a probability level below 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01. All regressions where estimated with a full set of year dummies to control for year specific effects. Furthermore, both are 2SLS estimates (all F-values of the IV's are larger than 10, as proposed by Staiger and Stock (1997) ) and the standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. Moreover, the variables are defined as follows:
INTERIM Dummy variable, equals one if an interim report was issued in the specific year and zero otherwise. SPREAD = Logarithm of yearly averages of the daily relative bid-ask spread, computed as difference between the daily bid-and ask-price divided by the average of bid-and ask. TRNVR = Logarithm of yearly average of daily share-trading volume divided by the average of shares outstanding. SIZE = Logarithm of market capitalization at the end of year t stdP = Logarithm of standard deviation of the intra-year stock price PRICE = Logarithm of average stock price for year t VOLUME = Logarithm of average daily trading volume for year t SHRSOUT = Logarithm of shares outstanding at year end US = dummy variable, equals one if firm is listed on a U.S. stock-exchange in year t and zero therwise Notes: * significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, *** significant at the 0.001 level.
Moreover, the variables are defined as follows: SIZE = Logarithm of market capitalization at the end of year t;
ANALYST= Logarithm of average number of EPS forecasts over 12 months preceding the annual earnings announcement; SPREAD = Logarithm of yearly averages of the daily relative bid-ask spread, computed as difference between the daily bid-and ask-price divided by the average of bid-and ask; TRNVR = Logarithm of yearly average of daily share-trading volume divided by the average of shares outstanding; DISPERSION= Logarithm of the average variance from the EPS-forecast mean; LVRG= Leverage, defined as debt/total assets; stdevROA= Logarithm of standard deviation of the firm's return on assets computed over the previous 5 years; US = dummy variable, equals one if firm is listed on a U.S. stock-exchange in year t and zero otherwise. 
